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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CAROL A. FIX, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Trial Court No. 941900385FS 
Appellate No. 950045-CA 
Priority Classification: 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (f) , Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended, which gives the Court appellate jurisdiction over 
appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Was there sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict that Appellant was involved in an 
accident resulting in injury to the alleged victim (emphasis 
added)• 
Standard of Review: In challenging the sufficiency 
of evidence, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict, and then demonstrate how this 
evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is 
insufficient to support the verdict. State v. Pilling, 875 
P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah 
App. 1991). An appellate court will reverse on the basis of 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994). 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err in refusing to 
allow evidence of Normand Knudson's intention to sue Ms. Fix 
for money damages, and refusing to allow a proffer of the 
relevance of the same? 
Standard of Review: The refusal of a trial court to 
allow evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and 
appellant must demonstrate that the error would have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict. 
State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Section 41-6-31, Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an 
accident resulting in injury to or death of any 
person...shall: 
[Perform certain enumerated acts not at 
issue in this appeal] 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of 
conviction of a class A misdemeanor - Failure To Remain at the 
Scene of an Accident, Section 41-6-31(1), Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended, in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, 
District Judge. 
Statement of the Course of the Proceedings 
Appellant was charged with the crimes of Aggravated 
Assault, a third degree felony, and Failure to Remain at the 
Scene of an Accident, a class A misdemeanor, arising out of 
events occurring on March 25, 1994. She was bound over to 
stand trial after a preliminary examination on May 31, 1994, 
and had a two-day jury trial on November 3 and 4, 1994. She 
was acquitted of the felony charge, but convicted of the 
misdemeanor. She was referred to Adult Parole and Probation 
for a presentence investigation and filed a post-trial Motion 
to Arrest Judgment. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
On December 12, 1994, at defendants sentencing 
hearing, Judge Taylor denied her Motion to Arrest Judgment, 
and sentenced defendant to informal probation. 
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Statement of the Facts 
Appellant, Ms. Fix, was charged with the crimes of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and leaving the 
scene of an accident, a violation of Section 41-6-31, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended, for an incident occurring on March 
25, 1994, in which a Mr. Normand Ray Knudson was the alleged 
victim. 
Ms. Fix and one Lori Bryan, were in downtown Ogden 
around noon on March 25, 1994. Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., 
Vol I, at pages 3-8. A dispute arose between the two women 
over who had cut off whom in traffic. The dispute involved 
some body language-type of profanity, hostile looks, etc. 
Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol I, at pages 3-8. 
Ms. Fix wanted to confront Ms. Bryan concerning what 
Ms. Fix perceived to be Ms. Bryan's rude and abusive behavior 
towards her. Testimony of Carol Fix, Tr., Vol. II, at pages 
11-12. Ms. Bryan had a different perspective on the incident, 
and testified generally that, except for giving Ms. Fix "the 
bird" downtown in Ogden (well-known extended middle-finger 
gesture) , it was Ms. Fix who was rude and abusive. Testimony 
of Lori Bryan, generally, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 3-54. 
Ms. Fix, in her car, followed Ms. Bryan, in her car, 
as Ms. Bryan drove eastbound, out of Ogden, heading up Ogden 
Canyon to pick up her children from a day care/babysitter 
service operated by Normand Knudsonfs mother. Testimony of 
Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 12-16. 
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Ms. Bryan and then Ms. Fix entered onto a road to 
the immediate north of the Ogden River, where the day care was 
located, and were again involved in a confrontation after Ms. 
Fix pulled in immediately behind Ms. Bryan. Again, Ms. Fix 
and Ms. Bryan disagree as to which of them was angry or 
verbally abusive, or aggressive. Compare, Testimony of Lori 
Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, pages 16-27, with Testimony of Carol Fix, 
Tr., Vol. II, pages 15-20. 
The encounter near the day care between Ms. Bryan 
and Ms. Fix, only lasted a minute or so after which Ms. Bryan 
went into the day care center to call the police. Testimony 
of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 24-26. Ms. Fix had not 
gotten out of her car, nor threatened Ms. Bryan directly. 
Testimony of Carol Fix, Tr., Vol. II, at page 18; Testimony of 
Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at page 52. 
The altercation between Ms. Bryan and Ms. Fix had 
been observed somewhat by Normand Knudson and his father from 
a point about 150 feet to the west on the same road. 
Testimony of Normand Knudson, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 55-61. 
When Ms. Bryan went into the day care building, Ms. Fix turned 
her car around and pulled up parallel to Ms. Bryan's. Mr. 
Knudson claims he saw Ms. Fix spit repeatedly into the open 
window of Ms. Bryan's car. Testimony of Normand Knudson, Tr., 
Vol. I, at page 62, while Ms. Fix says she spat only once, and 
not in the open window, but on a tire. Testimony of Carol 
Fix, Tr., Vol. II, at page 21. Most significantly, Ms. Bryan 
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did not see this. Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at 
page 40, lines 22-25. 
After spitting, Ms. Fix started to drive westbound 
to leave the scene by the same route by which she had arrived. 
Ms. Bryan, despite repeated prodding from the prosecutor at 
trial, would not say that she drove off at excessive speed. 
Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at pages 28-30. Ms. 
Bryan did not observe the ensuing encounter between Ms. Fix 
and Normand Knudson. Testimony of Lori Bryan, Tr., Vol. I, at 
page 53. 
From this point on, Ms. Fix and Normand Knudson tell 
greatly varying versions of what occurred. Mr. Knudson 
testified that Ms. Fix drove her motor vehicle at him and 
struck him while travelling at anywhere from 15 to 25 miles 
per hour. See, generally, testimony of Normand Knudson, Tr., 
Vol. I, at pages 55-126; Testimony of David Lord, Tr., Vol. 
II, at pages 127-129; Testimony of Terry Thompson, Tr., Vol. 
I, page 144, at lines 10-12 (25 mph). While giving varied 
descriptions of Ms. Fix's action in driving at and running him 
down, Mr. Knudson at trial was consistent that she drove at 
him fast and that the impact with his body was substantial -
"...And the car hit me, rolled me across the front hood, and 
I was able to push myself away from the car as much as I 
could, and slammed into the fence." Tr., Vol. I, page 64, 
lines 5-8 (emphasis added); "...and I slammed the same 
shoulder into the fence." Tr., Vol. I, page 66, lines 1-2; "I 
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don't remember actually saying the back of my head# but I do 
remember saying that I had hit the car with probably every 
part of my body: my knees, my torso, my head, my arms, when 
I was slammed onto the hood of the car." Tr., Vol. I, at page 
76, lines 4-8 (emphasis added); "...The vehicle hit me at a 
substantial rate of speed. I hit and slid into the windshield 
because the car was still moving forward. It slammed me down. 
The car moved me forward....I had been struck on the right 
side of my body and my head had been hit." Tr., Vol. I, at 
page 76, lines 13-20 (emphasis added); "...that's when the 
bumper hit my feet and slammed me onto the hood." Tr., Vol. 
I, page 77, lines 9-10 (emphasis added); "...after I had 
gotten slammed onto my right side, I rolled and pushed myself 
off from the car." Tr., Vol. I, page 80, lines 5-7; also line 
10 (emphasis added); "...I fell back and my right shoulder 
slammed into the fence..." Tr., Vol. I, page 86, lines 6-7. 
The following is testimony that is a representative 
summary of Mr. Knudson's version: 
Q. ... So the car came at you at 
20, 25 miles an hour, right? 
A. Approximately. 
Q. All right. Certainly not 
coming at you then slowing way down to 
maybe two, three miles an hour. That's 
just out of the question? 
A. Definitely. 
Q. And that was a hard impact 
between your body and that car? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. It - smacked you down. 
A. I was thrown onto the hood of 
the car. It took me from standing 
vertical and threw me to the hood. 
Tr., Vol. I, page 84, lines 12-24. 
Thus, Normand Knudson's basic version was that Ms. Fix struck 
him at a high rate of speed; that he was thereby thrown up 
onto the hood of her car, into the windshield, and then off 
the driver's side into a chain link fence. 
Normand Knudson claimed to have suffered the 
following injuries as a result of being struck by Ms. Fix's 
car: right arm and right shoulder, Tr., Vol. I, page 65; 
right knee, Tr., Vol. I, page 66; back, Tr., Vol. I, page 68; 
bleeding hand, Tr., Vol. I, page 69. He acknowledged the 
following on cross-examination: that there were no visible 
cuts and bleeding. Tr., Vol. I, page 82, lines 16-25; and 
that there were no visible bruises, Tr., Vol. I, page 83, 
lines 10-15. He also testified that Ms. Fix after having 
struck him with her car, left the scene knowing he was 
injured. Tr., Vol. I, page 62. 
Ms. Fix had a different version of what had 
occurred. She testified that as she was leaving, Normand 
Knudson came charging out, looking extremely angry, from 
behind the big cement box. Testimony of Carol Fix, Tr., Vol. 
II, page 24; that she hit her brakes and came to a stop, Tr., 
Vol. II, page 24, and that Normand Knudson jumped up on the 
car, by which she explained that she meant "...And when I say 
he jumped upon the car, he jumped and his hands were on the 
hood of the car." Tr., Vol. II, page 24, lines 10-12. She 
further testified that he was never on the hood (other than 
his hands) , that she became frightened, and that, as he tried 
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to push her car back, she inched forward in first gear. Tr., 
Vol. II, pages 25-28. He then jumped to the driver's side of 
the car, lunged at her, punched the rear, driver's side 
window, called her a bitch, and she left. Tr., Vol. II, pages 
27-29. 
The State entered into evidence as Exhibit #5 Ms. 
Fix's written statement to Deputy Thompson, the investigating 
officer. The State contended that this statement corroborated 
Normand Knudson's version. The written statement, in part, 
reads "...and [I] was leaving when a man jumped upon the hood 
of my car. He wouldn't get off and he was determined to stop 
me. (He actually ran into the path of the car and jumped on 
the hood). He called me a bitch, etc....I did not stop 
because the man looked crazy - he finally got out of the way 
and he punched the passenger window behind the driver's seat. 
I continued to drive away and I did not look back. I did not 
call the police because there was nothing to discuss between 
the woman and myself. I did not know the man was hurt or I 
would have stopped. I have checked myself into an anger 
control class at YCC." R., p. 287 (Exhibit Sheet). 
Deputy Terry Thompson of the Weber County Sheriff's 
Department corroborated that Normand Knudson described Ms. 
Fix's car as accelerating at him, Tr., Vol. I, page 139. On 
cross-examination, he admitted the following: that there was 
no dent to the hood of her car, Tr., Vol. I, pages 141-142; 
that there was no visible damage to the windshield area, hood 
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or grille, Tr., Vol. I, page 143; and that the only mark he 
found was an alleged paint scuff in the lower, center hood, 
Tr., Vol. I, page 141, which he "...wouldn't have found it if 
I hadn't of known what I needed to look for." Tr., Vol. I, 
page 143, lines 3-4. Significantly, Deputy Thompson did not 
offer an opinion on, nor was he asked by the prosecution, as 
to what caused the basically invisible paint scuff. 
Ms. Fix called Dr. Howard Lund, the emergency room 
doctor who treated Normand Knudson about four hours after the 
incident. Dr. Lund, and his supporting staff, observed no 
difficulty in Mr. Knudson's walking for a prolonged period of 
observation, Tr., Vol. II, page 87; found no signs of head 
injury, Tr., Vol. II, page 88; neck and back supple and 
nontender, Tr., Vol. II, page 89; no acute abrasions, scar, 
erythema or areas of pain; Tr., Vol. II, page 89; and in 
general, "...no injury apparent with that exam whatsoever." 
Tr., Vol. II, page 95, lines 9-10. Dr. Lund also testified 
that at 25 mph, he would expect to see scrapes, bruises and 
abrasions, Tr., Vol. II, pages 90, 96-97. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Lund explained that Mr. 
Knudson, had complained of pain in the right arm, wrist and 
back, but he "...did not find pain in the arm, in the wrist, 
or in the back," Tr., Vol. II, page 98, lines 21-23, and he 
explained his methodology, Tr., Vol. II, pages 99-100, 
concluding that "I can tell you that there was no exhibited 
pain during my exam." Tr., Vol. II, page 100, lines 12-13. 
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Ms. Fix also called Mr. David Lord, an accident 
reconstructionist, as a witness. Mr. Lord reviewed the 
following: the preliminary hearing transcript, which 
contained Normand Knudson,s sworn testimony, more than a month 
after the incident; all witness statements taken by the 
investigating officer (Deputy Thompson); Deputy Thompson's 
accident scene drawing; and personally inspected the scene. 
Tr., Vol. II, pages 122-123. He also examined Mr. Knudson's 
medical records from his emergency room visit (Dr. Lund's 
records), Tr., Vol. II, page 126. 
Mr. Lord gave his opinion from two approaches. One, 
calculating how fast Ms. Fix's car was going at impact, using 
Normand Knudson's version of events, and the second 
calculating the speed at impact, if any, using Mr. Knudson's 
description of his injuries. As to the former (calculating 
speed) , Mr. Lord testified that at fifteen miles per hour 
impact, there should have been broken bones, smashing into the 
windshield, severe leg bruising, damage to the car's grille, 
denting of the hood. Tr., Vol. II, pages 131-134. He would 
have expected damage to the chain link fence or Mr. Knudson's 
body, as a result. Tr., Vol. II, page 135. 
Mr. Lord examined the photos of Ms. Fix's car (the 
same ones Deputy Thompson observed in his testimony), and 
testified that the damage to her car was "...consistent with 
either no impact or a very, very low speed; not enough to 
break the grille work - the plastic grille work." Tr., Vol. 
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II, page 143, lines 14-16. Most significantly, Mr. Lord used 
as a basis for all of his calculations and opinions, Normand 
Knudson/s repeated testimony at the preliminary hearing, as 
follows: 
A. On page 20, line 15, part of an 
answer to a question of yours, stated she 
just accelerated towards him. 
Later in the next answer, starting 
at line 22, he said "She continued to 
accelerate, from the time she started 
towards me, she never slowed down. She 
seen me standing in the road, and she ran 
through me, she ran me down." 
Again, on page 22, starting at line 
one, "Answer: Well, she continued to 
accelerate. I was concerned that, you 
know, I figured she probably is doing 15 
to 20 miles an hour, and she wasn't - she 
didn't seem to be slowing down." 
On page 30, the question is asked: 
"Okay. You're somewhere between 100 and 
200 feet away and this car is stationary; 
that's your testimony?" 
"Yeah. Yeah." 
Answer - or question, I'm sorry. 
"Okay. Now, and you say she just 
accelerated right at you and you didn't 
have any chance to move anywhere, while 
she travelled from scratch 100 to 200 
feet; you don't think you had a chance to 
move anywhere? Is that what your 
testimony was?" 
Answer: "I backed - I take a couple 
of steps back. I already said that." 
On page 42, a question is: "Where -
how did you get up on the hood, whether 
you jumped or you jumped straight up; 
now, what part of your body was first hit 
by the car going 20 miles an hour?" 
"My right - my right leg." 
Page 52, on line 24, question is 
asked again, "And you just stood there?" 
Answer: "I just stood there?" 
Tr., Vol. II, page 127, line 24 - page 
129, line 6. 
In sum, Mr. Lord's testimony was that at even ten or 
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fifteen miles per hour, which is lower than Normand Knudson's 
many, albeit varied, versions either Mr, Knudson would have 
suffered a significant observable physical injury, or that 
there would have been evidence of significant damage to Ms. 
Fix's car. No such evidence of either was observed by Mr. 
Lord. 
After a two day jury trial, Ms. Fix was acquitted of 
the aggravated assault charge, and convicted of the class A 
misdemeanor leaving the scene. Verdicts, R. at pages 272-273. 
She filed a post-verdict Motion to Arrest Judgment, which was 
denied. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Fix will argue that the evidence, even viewed in 
a light most favorable to the guilty verdict, was insufficient 
to support a finding that she was involved in an accident 
which resulted in an objectively observable injury to Normand 
Knudson. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
FOR THE JURY TO FIND THAT MS. FIX WAS 
INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT RESULTING IN 
INJURY TO NORMAND KNUDSON. 
When challenging the sufficiency of evidence to 
support a guilty verdict in a criminal case, a defendant must 
first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict 
and then demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the 
most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict. 
State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
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Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991). 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
Ms. Fix's argument is that there was not sufficient 
evidence that she should have known that Normand Knudson 
suffered an injury. Counsel can find only three sources of 
evidence even arguably supporting this point: (1) Normand 
Knudson's testimony. (2) Carol Fix's brief written statement 
give to Deputy Thompson (Trial Exhibit #5); (3) Normand 
Knudson's father's rebuttal testimony. 
Mr. Knudson's testimony appears in Tr., Vol. I, 
pages 55-126, and, summarized in a light most favorable to a 
finding of injury, was that Ms. Fix sped her car at him over 
an approximate 130 foot distance and slammed into him, 
slamming him into the hood and windshield and then off to the 
driver's side, slamming him into the adjacent chain link 
fence. He claimed to have impacted the car with "...probably 
every part of my body: my knees, my torso, my head, my arms, 
when I was slammed onto the hood of the car." Tr., Vol. I, 
page 76, lines 5-8. He testified as to his various injuries. 
Ms. Fix's statement contains the sentences "I wrote 
down her license plate number and was leaving when a man 
jumped upon the hood of my car. He wouldn't get off and he 
was determined to stop me. (He actually ran into the path of 
the car and jumped on the hood)." This presumably means that 
Ms. Fix's car knocked Normand Knudson off his feet, and she 
should have known that he was, or could be, injured. 
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Normand Knudson's father, Jeffrey Knudson, testified 
on rebuttal that Carol Fix's car accelerated at Normand, and 
that he actually saw Carol run down his son. Tr., Vol. II, 
pages 179, 180. 
Obviously, Ms. Fix gave an entirely different 
version of what had happened, and counsel acknowledges that 
generally, neither a trial court nor an appellate court will 
overturn a verdict for insufficient evidence just because a 
defendant has a different version of the facts. State v. 
Pilling, supra. An appellate court will reverse on the basis 
of insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or so improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994); State 
v. Workman , 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 1991). It is submitted 
that such is the case. 
Ms. Fix is arguing that the only evidence of Normand 
Knudson7s having suffered an injury, an element of the offense 
of leaving the scene, came from his own testimony which was so 
inherently improbable when viewed in the light of the physical 
evidence which could and should have corroborated something 
about his version, that reasonable minds could not have found 
an injury. First, however, she will address her statement and 
Jeffrey Knudson's rebuttal testimony. 
Ms. Fix's Statement, when read in its entirety, does 
not support a finding of injury. Her trial testimony, was 
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that, as she was leaving, Normand Knudson came charging out 
from behind the big cement box, looking extremely angry, and 
after she braked to a stop, jumped up on the hood of her car, 
by which she explained that she meant only that his hands were 
on the hood. See, Statement of Facts, above. 
Ms. Fix,s written Statement is actually consistent 
with her trial testimony. Her Statement says that "...He 
wouldn't get off and he was determined to stop me." If she 
had run Normand Knudson down and he had been injured and 
flopping around helplessly on her hood, why would she make the 
statement that he would not get off and was determined to stop 
her? Why would she also say "I did not know the man was hurt 
or I would have stopped." R., page 287, Exhibit #5. These 
statements are not at all supportive of Normand Knudson's 
version of what led to an injury, but rather, are 
corroborative of Ms. Fix's trial testimony that Normand 
Knudson was pushing on the hood of her car in an attempt to 
keep her from leaving. 
As to Jeffrey Knudson's testimony, viewed in its 
entirety, it is completely incredible. Right at the scene, 
Jeffrey Knudson told Deputy Thompson that he did not actually 
see the car hit his son, because the alleged impact was 
blocked from his view by the seven foot cement block. Tr., 
Vol. II, page 182. He also told Deputy Thompson that his son 
was carried approximately 150 feet before he was able to 
escape the vehicle. Tr., Vol. II, page 186. Jeffrey Knudson 
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went from claiming he did not see the impact to claiming he 
did see it. His testimony was not at all credible. His 
explanation that he actually saw the impact but was 
traumatized at the time is undercut completely by his having 
told Deputy Thompson that "the impact point was blocked from 
[his] view." Tr., Vol. II, page 182, lines 11-12. It is one 
thing to say simply that you did not see something, and 
another to say you did not see it because your view was 
blocked. 
Thus, the only testimony left to support the finding 
of injury is Normand Knudson's. It is submitted that 
testimony must be viewed in light of the total lack of 
physically corroborating evidence. 
First, there was, simply put, no damage to any part 
of Ms. Fix's car, as established by the testimony of Deputy 
Thompson, the photographic evidence, Exhibit #6, R. at 287, 
and Carol Fix's testimony. Neither was there any damage to 
the chain link fence, as established by the testimony of 
Normand Knudson, Tr., Vol. I, page 78, lines 5-6; the 
photographic evidence, R. at 287, and David Lord's testimony. 
Mr. Lord established that if Carol Fix's car had been going 
even ten or fifteen miles per hour, there would have been 
either significant observable injury to Mr. Knudson, and/or 
damage to her car. 
Dr. Lund established that, approximately four hours 
after the incident, Normand Knudson: (1) had no visible 
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scars, abrasions or pain; (2) walked without any apparent 
distress; (3) generally showed no apparent injury on exam. 
Thus, several hours later, at the hospital emergency room, 
Normand Knudson was not observed to demonstrate any physical 
corroboration, either objectively (e.g., cuts, bruises, 
limping) or subjectively (pain). 
The physical evidence at the scene and upon physical 
examination are not only inconsistent with any finding of 
injury, but are consistent with Ms. Fix/s version. 
Summarized, Ms. Fix testified that there was no impact with 
Normand Knudson other than his putting his hands on the hood 
briefly; that he never got on the hood, or windshield; that 
she inched forward and he hopped around to the driver's side 
and eventually punched the window; and that she did not see 
him fall because she did not look back and he had pushed her 
side view mirror in. 
Ms. Fix also testified that she was frightened and 
left because of Mr. Knudson's extreme anger and behavior, Tr., 
Vol. II, pages 25-26, 30; Statement, Trial Exhibit #5, R. at 
287, and that she told Deputy Thompson, about an hour after 
the incident, as follows: 
Q - Did Deputy Thompson appear to 
you to be more concerned with what had 
happened between you and Mr. Knudson or 
with what happened with Ms. Bryan? 
A - I just think he was doing his 
job and trying to find out what happened 
overall. He had mentioned that this man 
claimed that he was injured, and I told 
Deputy Thompson that there was no way he 
got injured. That if he had done any 
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damage whatsoever, he may have broken his 
hand from where he punched the window. 
Tr., Vol. II, page 33, lines 14-24. 
This testimony went basically to the issue of 
whether Normand Knudson was angry before he got in front of 
the car, which was a theory of the case of Ms. Fix. Her 
theory was supported by the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. 
David McCann, concerning Normand Knudson's recent medical 
history of having been on a prescription for prozac to 
control, among other things, his anger and frustration. Tr., 
Vol. II, page 114, and by Normand Knudson's admitting that he 
was not taking prozac on or around the day of the incident, 
Tr., Vol. II, pages 167-169. Thus, Ms. Fix's position was 
that Normand Knudson overreacted totally to their 
confrontation, and distorted what had occurred. 
This was corroborated by Normand Knudson's testimony 
at trial. On direct examination, seven months later, he still 
referred to Ms. Fix as "...a threat to society." Tr., Vol. I, 
page 69, lines 23-24. On cross-examination he denied telling 
Deputy Thompson that he would find out where Carol Fix lived 
and take care of the problem himself, Tr., Vol. I, pages 92-
93, but Deputy Thompson testified that he did make that 
statement. Tr., Vol. I, page 150. In addition, Deputy 
Thompson's supervisor, Sergeant Arthur Haney, observed the 
same belligerence and threats four hours later at the hospital 
emergency room. Tr., Vol. II, pages 108-109. This is further 
support for the lack of credibility of Normand Knudson's 
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testimony. 
Counsel could not find any Utah case law on the 
issue of whether there is an objective or subjective standard 
for the finding of "injury." Judge Taylor defined "bodily 
injury" for the jury, Instruction #19, R. at 267, but used the 
simple term "injury", rather than bodily injury, in setting 
out the elements of the leaving the scene charge, Instruction 
#17, R. at 265. Either way, it is submitted that there must 
be objective evidence of injury, i.e., that, from the 
evidence, the defendant knew, or should have known, that the 
victim had been injured. 
As mentioned above, a reversal for insufficient 
evidence will only be merited when the evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as 
to that element. State v. Pilling, supra; State v. Scheel, 
supra; also, State v. Workman, 852 P. 2d 981 (Utah 1993) 
(applying standard to motion to arrest judgment); State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 
942 (Utah 1979); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). 
Such is the case here. None of the physical evidence 
corroborates or supports Normand Knudson's version of the 
accident or his alleged injuries. The evidence, in fact, 
supports Ms. Fix's version. The only evidence supporting a 
finding of injury to Mr. Knudson is his own testimony, which, 
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it is submitted, is inherently improbable and not credible. 
The standard must be that there be evidence of some injury 
observable by the defendant, or capable of observation. In 
this case, that evidence was too improbable and incredible. 
Ultimately, Normand Knudson's version of events, which is the 
only possible factual basis for a conviction, was that he was 
struck hard by an accelerating motor vehicle and injured. In 
light of the complete absence of observable physical 
corroboration, the jury must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that he was injured. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
REFUSED TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF NORMAND 
KNUDSON'S INTENTION TO SUE MS. FIX FOR 
MONEY DAMAGES, OR TO ALLOW A PROFFER AS 
TO THE RELEVANCE OF THE SAME. 
During cross-examination of Normand Knudson, counsel 
for Ms. Fix attempted to show his bias by questioning him 
about his intention to sue Ms. Fix civilly for money damages. 
Tr., Vol. I, page 98. Judge Taylor sustained the State,s 
objection to the evidence's relevancy, and the following 
colloquy occurred: 
MR. CUSTEN [Counsel for Ms. Fix]: 
May I approach? 
THE COURT: No. Sustained. 
MR. CUSTEN: May I be heard outside 
of the presence of the jury? 
THE COURT: No. Sustained. 
MR. CUSTEN: May I make a record? 
THE COURT: We'll allow you to make 
a record afterwards. 
MR. CUSTEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Although you've made 
your record. 
MR. CUSTEN: Not on that. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
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MR. CUSTEN: Not -
THE COURT: Now, wait just a 
second. Mr. Custen, y° u' v e raised your 
objection. That's - that has been 
preserved for the record, whatever 
objection you have. The fact that I have 
chosen not to accept argument on it is 
beside the point. You've made your 
record. 
MR. CUSTEN: No. I wasn't seeking 
to argue, but simply to state the reasons 
- outside of the presence of the jury -
that I felt it was relevant. 
THE COURT: I understand, and I'm 
saying no. Go ahead. 
Tr., Vol. I, page 98, line 23-page 99, 
line 23 (emphasis added). 
Rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that 
"Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise." In this case, it was Ms. Fix's position 
that Mr. Knudson's testimony, in addition to being inherently 
improbable and not credible, was the product of bias because 
he had in mind a lawsuit for money damages. This shows 
clearly a reason to misrepresent on Mr. Knudson's part, is 
therefore relevant, and the evidence should have been 
admitted. 
Judge Taylor then proceeded to compound the error by 
refusing to allow defense counsel to proffer his evidence 
and/or his reasons for this line of questioning. Defense 
counsel would have proffered that he was going to call a Mr. 
Chris Clougherty, an insurance adjuster for Ms. Fix's 
automobile liability carrier, who would have testified, as 
follows: that he interviewed Normand Knudson as part of his 
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investigation of the accident within a few weeks of its 
occurrence; that Mr. Knudson's first statement to him, even 
before the tape recorder was activated, was to ask him how 
much liability insurance Ms. Fix had. 
Counsel acknowledges that the Record is silent as to 
any proffered testimony of Mr. Clougherty. The reason is that 
Judge Taylor foreclosed counsel's opportunity to make a 
proffer, by mistakenly characterizing it as "your objection", 
Tr., Vol. I, page 99, line 13 (emphasis added). Ms. Fix's 
counsel was not objecting; rather, the State objected and the 
trial court, after sustaining the objection, refused to hear 
argument concerning relevance or any other matter, including 
a proffer. Although the Record is silent as to any proffer of 
Mr. Clougherty7s testimony, that is because counsel, having 
been foreclosed from even arguing or making a record of the 
evidence's bias-based admissibility while cross-examining 
Normand Knudson, did not want to engage in what he perceived 
to be a futile attempt to introduce Mr. Clougherty's 
testimony. 
Even if it was error to fail to admit the bias 
evidence and line of questioning, Ms. Fix must demonstrate 
that the error would have had a substantial influence in 
bringing about a different verdict. State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 
1986) . In this case, as argued above in Point I of this 
Brief, the evidence supporting a finding that Normand Knudson 
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suffered an "injury" was based solely on his testimony, which 
is inherently improbable and not credible. When viewed in 
light of his alleged bias and motive to misrepresent (because 
he was after money and it is really his word versus Ms. Fix's 
as to what happened) , the failure to allow the line of 
questioning could have had a substantial influence in bringing 
about a different verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the elements of leaving the scene of an 
accident is that a person suffer an injury. The injury must 
be such that Ms. Fix knew, or should have known, it occurred. 
If Ms. Fix had run down Normand Knudson as he alleges, at a 
significant rate of speed, she would be guilty and there would 
be sufficient evidence to support the verdict. However, the 
evidence of Mr. Knudson's injuries is supported solely by his 
testimony. There is no physically corroborating evidence, 
and, in fact, all of the physical evidence supports and 
corroborates Ms. Fix's version, which was that only Mr. 
Knudson's hands touched her car and, hence, there was no 
injury nor did she think there had been injury. 
Mr. Knudson's testimony was so inherently improbable 
as to be not credible. As such, there was insufficient 
evidence to support the finding of injury. In addition, the 
trial court's failure to allow questioning and testimony 
concerning Mr. Knudson's bias and motive to misrepresent, on 
the basis of its irrelevance, was error. 
25 
For the above and foregoing reasons, Ms. Fix asks 
that this Court reverse her conviction for leaving the scene, 
upon the basis of insufficient evidence, and remand to the 
trial court with direction to discharge her. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2J1 of April, 1995. 
/L-fe. (d 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of 
April, 1995, I mailed two true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to . 
Mr. Fred Voros 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellee 
Criminal Appeals Division 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
/ w f c (A) . (L.-XZZ 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
26 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is needed, because the one relevant 
statute is set forth in the Brief. 
